Price Daniel, Texas Democrats, and School Segregation, 1956-1957 by Waite, Charles
East Texas Historical Journal
Volume 48 | Issue 2 Article 10
10-2010
Price Daniel, Texas Democrats, and School
Segregation, 1956-1957
Charles Waite
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/ethj
Part of the United States History Commons
Tell us how this article helped you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by SFA ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in East Texas Historical Journal by an
authorized administrator of SFA ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact cdsscholarworks@sfasu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Waite, Charles (2010) "Price Daniel, Texas Democrats, and School Segregation, 1956-1957," East Texas Historical Journal: Vol. 48: Iss.
2, Article 10.
Available at: http://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/ethj/vol48/iss2/10
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Price Daniel, Texas Democrats, and School
Segregation, 1956-1957
By CHARLES WAITE
2010
I n the mid-1950s, Texas maintained a largely southern politicalculture. As in the other ex-Confederate states, the Democraticprimary represented the real election, with the general election
in November a mere formality against token Republican opposition.
Because Texas remained a one-party state, different factions
within the Democratic Party constantly struggled for power, with
conservatives usually the victors.
During the mid 1950s, the issue of race energized such an intra-
party schism. During the election season of 1956, the racial issue
was the most volatile issue and elections throughout the South in that
ycar hinged on the explosive issue of states' responses to the United
States Supreme Court's 1954 Brown v. Board ofEducation decision,
which required states to desegregate HInherently Unequal" public
schools. Although Texas never elected an extreme segregationist
such as Alabama's George Wallace or Mississippi's Ross Barnett,
its main gubernatorial aspirants all spoke out against integrated
schools during the 1956 Democratic primary campaign. The primary
candidates for the governor's mansion both grappled with the issue.
Price Daniel and Ralph Yarborough represented the conservative
and liberal wings of the party respectively, while on the fringes of
race-baiting politics ex-governor W. Lee "Pappy" 0' Daniel and
West Texas rancher and historian J. Evetts Haley promised extreme
measures to stop integration
During the mid-to-Iate 1950s, most of the ex-Confederate states
adopted some variation of"massive resistance" to the Brown decision.
Although Texas was, and remains, a diverse state geographically and
culturally, it still resembled the rest of the South in its determination
to prevent desegregation of public schools. Attempts at "massive
resistance" in Texas did not last as long as those in some Deep South
states, but segregationist legislation and racial politics did reflect the
most contentious issue facing the state leadership during the first
tenn of Governor Price Daniel, from 1957 to 1959.
Maintaining public school segregation represented a popular
issue, especially in East Texas, during the gubernatorial election
of 1956. Candidate Daniel, a typical southern segregationist of the
Charles Waite is an Assistant Professor of History at The
University afTexas-Pan American.
VOL. XLVIII, No.2
110 *
EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL JOUR."'AL FALL 2010
Price Daniel, Texas Democrats, and School Segregation
period, had been one of the few members of the Texas delegation
during his senate term to sign the Southern Manifesto, which called
the Brown decision unconstitutional. As state Attorney General, he
had worked unsuccessfully to keep the University of Texas Law
School segregated in the landmark Sweatt v. Painter case of 1950, and
while campaigning in 1956 he often denounced "forced integration,"
and promised to use his power as governor to preserve segregation
wherever a majority of the population opposed integration. I
The two dominant candidates in the 1956 race, Daniel and
Judge Ralph Yarborough, represented distinctly different factions
of the Texas Democratic Party. Since the early 1940s, state
Democrats had engaged in bitter intra-party feuds between liberals
and conservatives. Daniel, as a result of his support for Republican
presidential candidate Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952 and his close
association with fellow Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, had emerged as
leader of the conservative wing. Yarborough, on the other hand, was
supported by the left-leaning Democrats of Texas (DOT) and posed
the greatest threat to the state's conservative establishment. As for
the Republicans, the GOP had little power in 1950s Texas below
the national level and the "I like Ike" presidential campaigns of the
decade.
Yarborough and Daniel, despite such convenient labels, actually
held similar positions on many issues throughout the campaign. Both
favored higher pay for teachers, water conservation, and cleanup of
corruption in state government after the scandals of the Allan Shivers
Administration. When it came to school segregation, both candidates
opposed the Brown decision (at least rhetorically), although neither
supported "massive resistance" against the United States Supreme
Court. Perhaps because Daniel and Yarborough's platforms seemed
so similar, each candidate resorted to personal attacks to distinguish
himself from the other. The Senator regularly charged that his
opponent represented the interests of "Big Labor" and the National
Association for the Advancement ofColored People (NAACP) rather
than those of ordinary Texans. Yarborough, for his part, told voters
that Daniel was nothing but a tool of Wall Street business interests
who had sold out to the Republican Party by supporting Eisenhower
for president four years earlier.2
As if Daniel and Yarborough's verbal attacks were not enough
to entertain voters that year, fonner Governor W. Lee O'Daniel also
entered the race on an extreme pro-segregation platform. O'Daniel
had been enormously popular among ordinary voters when he ran
successfully for governor in 1938 and 1940, and for the United States
Senate in 1941. The 1956 gubernatorial race represented "Pappy's"
last serious effort to win back his old position.
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Opening his campaign in May, O'Daniel ridiculed school
desegregation as a "screwy" idea, and ominously warned that it would
lead to violence in which "the red blood of both whites and Negroes
..." would run in the streets of Texas towns and cities. Announcing
his contempt for Chief Justice Earl Warren and the Supreme Court,
O'Danicl promised that when he took office again, "the people can
just forget about the [desegregation] order." Apparently "Pappy"
believed that state governors could simply ignore or nullify federal
court orders that did not please them. The candidate also told white
crowds that they had nothing to fear from the "nine old men" on
the Supreme Court because the judges were "cowards" who avoided
fights with real men and only picked on "little urchins toddling off
to Kindergarten."]
The worst of0'Daniel's demagoguery focused on the Supreme
Court, but he also joined in the name-calling contest between Daniel
and Yarborough. As he had in 1938, "Pappy" portrayed himself as
an outsider and representative of the common people bravely taking
on the professional politicians in Austin and Washington, D.C. He
called Daniel the "little junior senator" beholden to the "millionaire
clique" that controlled the state's politics. O'Daniel also joked that
his two main opponents were politicians who ran "every time there
is an election-just for the exercise."4
West Texas rancher and author 1. Evetts Haley represented the
most extreme end of racist opposition to integrated schools. The
Haley campaign distributed pamphlets and flyers that called for
"Continued segregation of the races without compromise." In what
marked the low point of a campaign in which all of the principal
candidates played on the racial fears of white voters, Haley actually
promised, ifelected, to usc the Texas Rangers to stop federal marshals
from crossing the Red River into Texas to enforce desegregation
orders. The West Texan also called on Congress to impeach all of
the Supreme Court justices for their "illegal and immoral" decision
in the Brown case. Finally, Haley resurrected South Carolinian John
C. Calhoun's nineteenth century Doctrine of Nullification, calling on
Texans to declare the Brown decision null and avoid. Oddly enough,
the candidate most connected to the West tried to use an outdated
southern states-rights position to further his goals over ninety years
after the crushing defeat of the Confederacy. S
Although the candidacies of O'Daniel, and especially Haley,
represented only the most racist fringe ofTexas politics, the relatively
minor candidates still constituted a threat to both Yarborough and
Daniel. The Senator, as the more conservative of the two mainstream
candidates, worried about the appeal ofHaley and Q'Daniel to voters
who might otherwise favor his candidacy. During his tenure as
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attorney general of Texas and in the U.S. Senate, Daniel had firmly
established his credentials as a segregationist. In a head to head
contest against Yarborough, Daniel would have had greater appeal to
white segregationist voters, but Haley and O'Daniel complicated all
of thc Senator's political calculations on the race issue. Yarborough
had to worry as well because poor rural whites, a group that strongly
supported segregation, represented his strongest constituency.
Daniel tried to boost his appeal against all three ofhis opponents
by somewhat duplicating the O'Daniel and Haley strategies and
pandered to the racist fears of many white voters, particularly in
East Texas. Throughout the campaign he charged that the NAACP
and other civil rights organizations supported Yarborough-an
accusation with no real substance. Speaking in Houston on June
5, the Senator charged that "extreme radical left-wingers" in the
NAACP and the CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations) saw the
Texas governor's race as an opportunity to "seize control of the state
government not for the next two years but for years to come." Daniel
also argued that the NAACP, and by extension Yarborough, '"want to
centralize everything in Washington and they are well organized."
Fear of "outside agitation" ran strong among whites in the South7
and the Senator knew that playing on such a fear would help his
campaign.6
Daniel also used his position in the Senate to reassure white
voters at home that he supported segregation. Speaking in San
Angelo on July 5, he denounced a proposal by African American
New York Congressman Adam Clayton Powell to deny federal
school construction funds to states that maintained segregated
schools in defiance of the Brown decision. The Senator called the
Powell Amendment "the most vicious effort since Reconstruction
days to force upon Texas and the South total federal control of our
local affairs." Two weeks later in Houston, Daniel attacked the
congressional bill that eventually became the Civil Rights Act of
1957. Supported by the Eisenhower Administration, the measure
sought merely to protect black voting rights in the South. Along
with senators from other ex-Confederate states, Daniel appealed to
his white constituents by calling the bill a dire threat to "individual
Iiberties.7 ' Obviously not concerned about the liberties of African
American voters, the Texan promised that if the civil rights bill
reached the floor of the Senate, he would immediately return to
Washington and ''join my Southern colleagues in defeating the bill."7
Daniel's criticism and the overwhelming opposition to school
desegregation put Yarborough in a difficult position. Today the
judge is remembered as one of the most liberal senators Texas
ever produced, given his support for Civil Rights and President
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Lyndon Johnson'8 Great Society in the 1960s. Judged by his words
in the 1956 campaign, however, Yarborough represented only the
least committed type of segregationist rather than a supporter of
integration. Generally, he tried to avoid the race issue and focus on
economic concerns, but Yarborough was a smart enough politician
to know that he had to oppose school integration to have any hope
of winning the race. He limited most of his comments on the Brown
decision to speeches in East Texas, where, like Daniell he attacked
"forced" integration. Yarborough pointed to his roots in East Texas
and announced that, as Ha grandson of two Confederate soldiers ..."
he "was born believing in state rights ...." Comments like this from
one of the most powerful liberals in the state illustrate the strength
of segregationist feelings in Texas even more than the outrageous
statements offringe candidates like O'Daniel and Haley. Yarborough
biographer Patrick Cox argues convincingly that Hat this stage of
his career he was still unwilling to publicly confront the integration
issue, which was to become a larger factor in efforts to modernize
the state. The voices ofdissent in Texas had not yet reached the level
where they could be heard over the shrill screams ofreaction."8
Democratic voters sorted through all of the campaign rhetoric
and made their choices in the first primary on July 28. Daniel garnered
the most support, 628/914 votes. Yarborough followed with a total of
463/410.0' Daniel did well among his old rural supporters, getting
347/757 votes. Haley, the candidate with the most extreme racist
platfonn, got only 88/772 votes. Since no candidate had received an
outright majority, a runoff election between Daniel and Yarborough
in August would decide the Democratic primary winner, in 1956
a decision that still represented the only meaningful election. The
Senator, publicly pleased with the results, portrayed his lead as a
victory against the "false propaganda" of the NAACP and the CIO.9
Second primaries were a normal feature ofpolitics in one-party
Texas. With several candidates running in the Democratic primaries,
outright majorities were rare and run-offs the norm. Candidates could
also expect defections from previous supporters, a trend Yarborough
experienced in July. Twenty-six former supporters urged the Judge
to withdraw from the run-off campaign in the interest of maintaining
the "'harmony" of the Democratic Party. Yarborough countered that
he had "just begun to fight" and called the defectors "turncoats" who
had perpetrated a "doublecross." On the other hand, the second-
place candidate got support from an unexpected quarter-O'Daniel.
"Pappy" endorsed Yarborough for the run-off, hoping to weaken
Daniel and run as an independent candidate in November. O'Danicl's
famous band, the "Hillbilly Boys," even repainted the slogan on their
campaign bus with the phrase "We're for Yarborough now."IO
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The second primary, once again, degenerated into personal
attacks by both candidates. Daniel continued his theme ofYarborough
as a tool of labor unions and civil rights groups. He charged that the
NAACP "controlled" ballot boxes in cities like Houston and Dallas
and had "lined up" behind Yarborough. The Judge did not hesitate
to hit back. He strongly denied that the African American vote
went only to him, telling white supporters that HPrice Daniel won
several boxes in Negro neighborhoods and was close in others." In a
humorous jibe, Yarborough said that the NAACP Daniel supported
stood for HNo action against crooked politicians, Chapter number
1." Such rhetoric during the second primary showed that, whatever
his later attitudes, Yarborough still needed to portray himself as a
segregationist to avoid losing the white vote. 11
The Judge's anti·integration tactics nearly paid off in the August
25 run-off election; Yarborough largely neutralized Daniel's appeal
on the segregation issue and nearly won the election. Election
officials took several days to detennine the final result, and observers
compared this election to "Landslide Lyndon" Johnson's narrow
victory over Coke Stevenson in the 1948 United States Senate
Election. The Texas Election Bureau announced the final total on
September 1, declaring Daniel the winner by only 3/343 votes, or
50.12 per cent ofthe total, the closest margin in a Texas gubernatorial
race since the creation of the Election Bureau. Yarborough and his
supporters believed the Daniel had prevailed due to fraud, as well as
Republicans voting for the Senator in the Democratic primary, but
Yarborough did not challenge the legal ity of the election. Instead,
he got his revenge on the conservative establishment by winning a
special election for Daniel's Senate seat in 1957. 12
The governor's race was not the only part ofthe 1956 Democratic
Primary that featured school segregation as an issue. Governor Alan
Shivers and the State Democratic Executive Committee (SDEC)
had maneuvered to put several pro-segregation measures before
the voters. Besides choosing between gubernatorial candidates who
all endorsed continued segregation, primary voters approved by a
four-to-one margin a referendum calling for state "interposition"
against integration. Voters also approved stronger laws against
interracial marriage, and a law prohibiting Hcompulsory attendance"
at desegregated schools. In September, before the general election,
Governor Shivers ordered Texas Rangers to prevent integration at
Mansfield High School and Texarkana Junior College. Clearly, white
voters and the state's political leaders still refused to accept that the
Brown decision was the law of the land. 13
After winning a narrow victory over Judge Yarborough in the
election~ Daniel had to live up to his promises to keep segregated
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schools in areas where the white population favored them. He took
office at a time when segregation, especially in schools, represented
an explosive issue throughout the South. Daniel and other southern
governors followed policies designed to thwart the impact of the
Brown ruling. Much of the work southern legislatures undertook
during Daniel '8 first term consisted of laws designed to defy or delay
integration of the schools. Segregationist lawmakers in Texas and
other southern states sought to use state authority to preserve the
dying "Jim Crown system. Several states authorized their governors
to close integrated public schools. "Pupil placement" laws, which
allowed local authorities to evade desegregation orders, represented
another tactic. 14
Texas joined in this segregationist trend with enthusiasm.
Governor Shivers had set up an Advisory Committee on Segregation
in the Public Schools after the original Brown decision to explore
ways to maintain the racial order. The Committee issued a report
in September, 1956, which called for the Legislature to "reconcile"
Supreme Court rulings with white opinion by enacting statutes
to prohibit "forced integration." Lawmakers from East Texas
introduced twelve bills in the new session to implement the report's
recommendations, including proposals to give state money to private
schools and remove state funding of integrated public schools. IS
Outside of East Texas, most legislators had only a lukewann
reaction to the segregationist bills. Only five of the original twelve
bills made it through the House to the Senate. Senators Henry B.
Gonzalez of San Antonio and Abraham Kazen of Laredo conducted
a marathon thirty-six hour filibuster that succeeded in defeating all
but two of the bills, one requiring "local option" elections before
schools desegregated and a "pupil-placemenC' law. The partial
success of the filibuster reflected the diverse ethnic composition of
Texas, as opposed to most other southern states. Gonzalez, one of the
Legislature's few Latino lawmakers, represented the large Mexican
American population of South Texas. Kazen, a second generation
Lebanese American, personified the state's traditional openness to
imrnigrants. 16
The debate proved exhausting for Gonzalez and Kazen, who
took turns attacking the segregation bills and delaying a final vote. At
one point Kazen spoke for over eleven hours. He predicted that ifthe
Legislature passed a pupil placement law, the Supreme Court would
overturn the racist legislation with "[G]one swoop of the pen." He
also denounced the Senate for '~fooling with human lives," and that
"It will be a sorry day when we have hyphenated Americans and
second-class Americans in Texas." Gonzalez attacked segregation as
a legal stigma against children and pointed out that Texas schools had
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long used segregation against both African American and Mexican
American students. 17
Two segregation bills survived the filibuster. House Bill 231,
sponsored by Virginia Duff ofFerris, provided ~'standardsother than
race," such as health, moral, psychological, or intelligence as factors
for pupil assignment. The requirements gave local officials plenty of
excuses to avoid assigning African American children to all-white
schools. House Bill 65, sponsored by Jerry SadlerofPercilla, required
voter approval before a school district desegregated. Daniel signed
both bills on May 23, 1957, announcing that he saw no constitutional
problems in the measures. 18
That fall a crisis in neighboring Arkansas revitalized racist
sentiment in Texas when a federal court ordered Little Rock's
Central High School to desegregate. Governor Orval Faubus
mobilized the Arkansas National Guard and encouraged white mobs
to block integration. Although President Dwight D. Eisenhower
opposed the Brown decision on constitutional grounds, he saw the
Arkansas governor's actions as a threat to the authority of the federal
judiciary. Eisenhower subsequently nationalized the state guard and
sent United States Army troops to Little Rock, where they escorted
African American students to class. 19
Whites throughout the South denounced Eisenhower's
action as "forced integration" reminiscent of the days of "Black
Reconstruction." In Texas, Daniel shared the sentiments, and he
told Representative Sadler that he admired Faubus, who "has done
as much to strengthen the cause of the South as all of the others
put together." Daniel even sent a telegram to the President, accusing
Eisenhower of adopting "the tactics of Reconstruction days." The
governor asked whether Eisenhower would now "occupy with troops
every non-integrated school in the South?" Daniel "respectfully"
urgcd the President to withdraw the troops in the interest of "good
will among the races ...." Eisenhower responded with a letter to
Daniel in which he expressed a desire to end the Little Rock crisis
as soon as possible. The President argued, however, that to remove
the troops prematurely "would be to acquiesce in anarchy and,
ultimately, the dissolution of the Federal Union."20
Publicly, Daniel retreated from his remarks to Sadler about
Faubus. Speaking in EI Paso on September 29, the governor blamed
both his Arkansas counterpart and Eisenhower for the crisis. Daniel
promised that because Texans had a "calmer" attitude toward
integration, there would be no need for "troops, machine guns, and
bayonets ..." in Texas schools. Ofcourse, Daniel ignored the problem
that his rhetoric and that ofhis fellow southern politicians only made
the debate over integration more intractable. The governor did note
* 117
FALL EAST TEXAS HTSTORICAL JOURNAL 2010
that EI Paso schools had already desegregated, and said that other
cities could solve their own problems if "outside agitators" left them
alone.21
After claiming that Texas would never face the threat of federal
troops in its schools, Daniel later proposed that the Legislature adopt
an "anti-troop" bill that would close down any schools "occupied"
by the military. He met with legislators from East Texas in October,
and promised to add segregation to the agenda of the upcoming
special session. East Texas politicians, representing the region
with the highest African American population, always stood as the
staunchest opponents of integration during this civil rights battle.
Like the governor himself, a native of Liberty in southeast Texas,
most East Texas whites were culturally more southern than western.
Daniel also talked to Florida Governor Leroy Collins about a school
closing bill that state had recently enacted.22
The Texas governor submitted his school closing proposal to the
Legislature on November 13. Hejustified the measure as necessary to
maintain law and order, to preserve Hgood relations among all of our
citizens," and to preserve states' rights. Daniel pointed to the Little
Rock crisis as a warning for Texans, but at the same time expressed
doubt that federal troops ever actually Hoccupi' the state's public
schools. However, he continued to push legislators to provide a plan
for closing schools in an emergency Huntil such time as peace and
order can be restored or maintained without the use or occupation of
military troops." Daniel ignored the fact that Faubus, not the federal
government, had provoked the crisis by defying the Supreme Court
and pandering to the racist fears of white Arkansans.23
State Senator Henry B. Gonzalez again led the opposition to
the new segregation measure. He denounced Daniel for stirring up
racial conflict and mocked the intentions of East Texas colleagues
who sought to "lower a com-pone curtain over their area.~' The
outspoken Gonzalez attacked Daniel as ~'a little man playing for
political motives." The assertion had some justification, given that
the governor himself had played down any real threats to send the
army into Texas schools. Religious and labor leaders also testified
against the bill. One Austin clergyman called the "anti-troop" label
misleading, accurately claiming that the legislation represented "a
pro-mob, anti-school, pro-federal troop bill."24
Mockery, moral pleas, and constitutional arguments all failed
to sway segregationist leaders. Tyler Representative Ben Ferrell
claimed that the opponents of the governor's bill "seem more
interested in cramming social dogma down our throats than they do
in educating our children." Sadler, the chiefsponsor of the legislation
in the House, argued that opponents represented Hdistinguished
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people" who "oppose law and order." Attorney General Will Wilson
argued that the bill was constitutional even though Eisenhower and
the federal courts had clearly won a victory over segregation earlier
that fall. 25
Supporters of school segregation broke an all-day filibuster
by Gonzalez and Abraham Kazen on November 22. Following the
procedure, the "anti-troop" bill easily passed. The measure gave the
governor the authority to close public schools if the local school
board certified that they faced "violence that only resort to use of
military force could prevent." The House approved the measure three
days later. Daniel praised the legislature's action~ saying "temporary
closure is preferable to attempting to educate our children under the
control of troops and in the atmosphere of rifles and bayonets."26
The "anti-troop" bill showed that however moderate Daniel
might seem compared to other southern governors such as Faubus,
he remained a segregationist. Neither Daniel nor any other Texas
governor ever implemented the measure, which raises the question of
whether he truly believed it necessary or only sought to make an easy
gesture to racist sentiment in Texas. Daniel certainly used passage of
the school closing bill solidify his segregationist credentials. He even
sent copies of the bill to several other southern governors. Daniel
also approved two more segregation bills from the special session-
one that authorized the attorney general to assist local school boards
that resisted desegregation suits, and the other that required members
of civil rights organizations to register with the state.27
The year 1957 represented the high tide of segregationist
attempts to legislate away the results of the 1954 Brown v. Board of
Education case. In the ugly aftermath ofthe 1956 governor's election,
segregationists in the legislature joined with Governor Daniel in
desperate attempts to save the old Jim Crow system in public schools.
In the long run, all they accomplished was to enact meaningless laws
that appealed to racist sentiment among many Texas whites, but did
little to hinder the ultimate progress of integration. In doing so, they
failed all of their constituents, black, white, and Hispanic. Texas
deserved better.
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